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RECENT DECISIONS

WILLS-FAILURE OF RESIDUARY CLAUSE TO PASS UNDEVISED PROPERTY

-Decedent, in his will, declared that he had, by trust agreement of even date,
"dispo~d of all my intangible personal property, both during the remainder
of my lifetime and after my death. Said Trust Agreement does not include
within its terms my real estate, my tangible personal property, or any money•
• • • This will is, therefore, specifically designed to provide for the distnbution
of said real estate, tangible personal property, and money." After certain
specific gifts decedent directed that, · "all the rest and residue of my estate,
of every description, real, personal and mixed, and wherever situated," be
divided among named charities. Before the date of execution of those instruments decedent had been advised that he might have a claim to the corpus
of a certain trust fund. He took no steps to have the matter determined, but
after his death it was judicially decided that he had inherited the securities in
the trust fund. Decedent's next of kin contended that decedent was intention;tlly intestate as to that fund. Held, contention rejected. Sheridan v. Per-

ktns, (Va. 1947) 42 S.E. (2d) 853.
The contention of the next of kin raises the question: under what circumstances will a clause, residuary in form, fail to carry all undevised property? 1
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Undoubtedly a testator may provide expressly for the exclusion of property
from the residuary clause. 2 In the principal case, however, the court construed
the recital in the will as simply declaratory of testator's motives and not as a
limitation on its scope. As an erroneous recital of fact, such a declaration would
not, per se, affect the operation of the residuary clause.8 It is frequently said
that "where the words used to show an intention on the _part of the testator to
exclude from the operation of the residuary clause certain portions of the
estate," 4 such intention must not be defeated. It is also said that such exceptions
need not be express, but may be gathered from the will as a whole. 5 However,
an examination of the cases indicates that the exception to the rule operates
only in restricted situations. The residuary clause may itself be so limited as to
fail to make the donee thereunder a general residuary legatee.6 A special instance of the limited residuary clause is the "particular residuary clause," where .
the clause refers only to some particular fund. 7 But the language of the clause
in the principal case is seemingly all inclusive, and less tied to the particular
fund than in the cases turning on that doctrine. 8 In some circumstances certain
specific property will not be included in the residue to pass under a residuary
clause, general in language, because to include it would be inconsistent with
other provisions in the will relating to that item, or to the residuary legatee,
or to the operation of the clause itself. Typical of such cases is Holton v.
J ones,9 in which testator devised property equally to the children of A for
their lives, without the power of alienation, remainder to A's grandchildren.
The general residue was to be sold with the proceeds going to A's children.
There were no grandchildren of A. It was held· that testator was intestate
as to the reversionary interest retained by operation of law because it would
be inconsistent to give the proceeds of the sale of that interest to the life
tenants who did n?t have the power of alienation.10 In some cases rever2 Kempson v. Kempson,· 89 N.J Eq. 205, 104 A. 86 (1918). Van Buskirk v.
Standard Oil Co., 94 N.J. Eq. 686, 121 A. 450 (1923).
8
3 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., 89 (1941). In re Bagot, [1893] 3 Ch. Div. 348;
Smith v. Dugan, 145 App. Div. 877, 130 N.Y.S. 649 (1911), a.ffd., 205 N.Y. 556,
98 N.E. 1116 (1912). In re Hunt's Will, 207 App. Div. 127, 202 N.Y.S. 224
(1923), a.ffd., 237 N.Y. 613, 143 N.E. 764 (1924).
4
Tindall's Exrs. v. Tindall, 24 N.J. Eq. 512 at 513 (1873).
5
3 PAGE, WILLS, 3d ed., 89 (1941).
6
See Atty. General v. Johnstone, Amb. 577,- 27 Eng. Rep. 373 (1769), in
which the language of the residuary clause indicated that the testator expected that
only a pittance would be left for the legatee. See also Wolf v. Schae.ffner, 51 Wis. 53,
8 N.W. 8 (1881).
,
7 Succession of McBurney, 162 La. 758, III S. 86 (1926). Oglesbee v. Miller,
III Ohio St. 426, 145 N.E. 846 (1924). Grise v. Weiss, 213 Ind. 3, II N.E. (2d)
146 (1937).
8
See Blankenbaker v. Early, 132 Va. 408, II2 S.E. 599 (1922), where the
relatively less general residuary clause was pointed out as a distinguishing feature.
9
133 N.C. 399, 45 S.E. 765 (1903).
10
See also Johnson v. Stanton, 30 Conn. 297 (1861), reversion did not go to
residuary legatee who was also remainderman on condition of surviving the life tenant,
and was donee of power of appointment in the alternative. Wetherill v. Le.fferts, 254
Pa. 484, 98 A. 1074 ( I 9 I 6), residue to be distributed at once, reversionary interest
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sionary interests in property in which particular estates were devised have
been held to be excepted from the residue, ipso facto. 11 At least that may be
done where testator has evidently tried to make final disposition of his entire
estate.12 Courts have gone further in limiting relatively broad residuary clauses
under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, than under any other theory. In fact in
McChesney v. Bruce,18 where testator failed to make any mention of real
estate, but made several bequests of personalty and concluded with, "It is
my desire that the proceeds of the servants' hire, together with all the residue
of my estate," be disposed of as specified, the court held that the generality of
the residuary clause was restricted by the antecedent bequests so as to confine
it to the residue of personalty. Bullard v. Goffe 14 is in accord, but these cases
show the influence of a strong preference against deflecting land from the
heirs at law. In most cases which rely on ejusdem generis, the language used
in the clauses in question could be classed as that of particular residuary clauses.15
Militating in favor of including, all undevised property in the residuary gift
is the presumption that such a clause is intended to embrace and carry all forgotten, unknown, or otherwise unmentioned property, and all lapsed and
invalid gifts.16
Robert T. Hmnes
which was postponed beyond two valid life estates held not included therein. Copenhaver v. Pendleton, 155 Va. 463, 155 S.E. 802 (1930).
11
Brinkerhoff v. Butler, 296 Ill. 368, 129 N.E. 742 (1921). Lane v. Patterson, 138 Ga. 710, 76 S.E. 47 (1912). Cf. Matthews v. Andrews, 290 Ill. 103, 124
N.E. 871 (1919).
12
Walton v. Walton, 73 N.J. Eq. 57, 67 A. 397 (1907).
18
I Md. 344 (1851).
14
20 Pick. (37 Mass.) 252 (1838).
15
Cole v. Ensor, 3 Md. 446 (1853). Minor's Executrix v. Dabney, 3 Rand
(24 Va.) 191 (1825).
16
Floyd v. Carrow, 88 N.Y. 560 at 568 (1882). See also Smith v. Dugan, 145"
App. Div. 877, 130 N.Y.S. 649 (19u); In re Ingham's Estate, 315 Pa. 293; 172.
A. 662 (1934).

